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Abstract 
 
Heuristic decision making received wide attention due to the work of Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981) and inspired multiple studies of irrationality of the human mind and a fundamental 
disregard for knowledge. But what is the source of all human knowledge, including heuristics? 
We discuss the hypothesis that acquisition of knowledge is a deeply rooted psychological need, a 
motivational mechanism for perception as well as higher cognition. We report experimental 
results showing that acquisition of knowledge is emotionally pleasing. The satisfaction of 
curiosity through acquiring knowledge brings pleasure. This confirms the hypothesis that 
curiosity or need for knowledge is a fundamental and ancient motivation on a par with other 
basic needs, such as sex or food.  This paper connects curiosity, knowledge, cognition, emotions, 
including aesthetic emotions of the beautiful, mechanisms of drives, high cognitive functions, 
minimization of cognitive effort through heuristics, and knowledge maximization. We anticipate 
our finding to be an important aspect for several classical fields including cognitive dissonance, 
personality, self, learning, and new directions in cognitive science studying emotions related to 
acquiring knowledge, personality types in relation to types of knowledge, relating higher 
cognitive abilities to knowledge-related emotions, and new directions in aesthetics revealing the 
cognitive nature of the beautiful and music. 
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Drives, emotions, and knowledge 
 
Biologists and psychologists have suggested, at least since the 1950s (Harlow, Harlow, & 
Meyer, 1950; Berlyne, 1960; Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones and Mills 1999), that humans and 
higher animals possess an innate drive for learning.  Its primary or secondary role in an organism 
was not clear.  Analyzing mathematical models of learning, Perlovsky (2006) noted that all such 
models use some mathematical mechanism of this drive. Perception, cognition, and an ability to 
satisfy any instinctual need would not be possible without a primary innate drive for learning. In 
all mathematical models this drive directs the organism to increase a measure of the 
correspondence between sensor signals and mental representations of the surrounding world. 
Correspondingly, he called this measure of the correspondence knowledge (Rehder & Hastie, 
2001), and suggested that the drive to increase knowledge, the Need for Knowledge, NfK, 
(Kagan, 1972) is innate and primary. First we discuss NfK, curiosity, and other related 
mechanisms without differentiating them; later we address fundamental differences. 
The idea of NfK may seem controversial and contradicting the body of work initiated by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981). This aspect of the paper will be discussed in details later. The 
NfK, related areas of curiosity, including need for cognition (Cohen, 1957; Cohen, Stotland, & 
Wolfe, 1955; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao 1984) are areas of extensive 
research with thousands of publications. However its motivational status, its relations to primary 
or secondary drives remain confused and unclear in recent research. “Cacioppo and Petty's… 
need for cognition… (its) motivational aspect that cannot be… conceptualized as needs, drives, 
or instincts.” (Cacioppo et al 1996).  
Loewenstein (1994) emphasized that “Theorizing about curiosity has been largely 
moribund… the general loss of interest in motivational phenomena such as curiosity… Virtually 
all… research has examined the cognitive strategies the people use for problem solving… 
Almost no research on why people are so powerfully driven to solve such problems… even so 
many researchers… have been struck by the intensity of individual’s efforts… in the absence of 
material rewards… Curiosity involves an indissoluble mixture of cognition and motivation… 
drive or not a drive is probably unanswerable.” In subsequent publications Lowenstein and 
colleagues concentrated on visceral aspects of curiosity (e.g. Lee, Loewenstein, Ariely, Hong, & 
Young, 2008). Litman (2005) developed a theory of curiosity related to interest-deprivation and 
motivational wanting-liking model. Schmidhuber (2009) suggested a theory of curiosity driven 
by a desire to find a maximally compressed representation of reality. After describing our work, 
we relate it in more details to the above discussion, and to various existing theories and 
experimental results. 
Here we suggest a motivational theory of curiosity, addressing the fundamental need for 
knowledge. We briefly summarize discussions that curiosity is fundamentally important for 
cognition as a whole. We conceptually review mathematical models of the mind-brain, and 
discuss that increasing knowledge is a part of all artificial intelligence algorithms and 
mathematical models of cognition. We argue these models describe a psychological drive that is 
primary and autonomous at lower levels of cognition (such as perception), and that it acquires 
aspects of conscious curiosity at higher levels of the mind.  
We build on a theory of drives and emotions suggested by Grossberg and Levine (1987). 
According to this theory, satisfaction or dissatisfaction of a drive is perceived emotionally 
(consciously or subconsciously). At lower levels of everyday perceptions these emotions usually 
are below the threshold of consciousness; NfK functions autonomously, similar to other bodily 
needs. For example, stomach functioning could be below a threshold of consciousness as long as 
it performs its functions as expected, but it immediately rises to a conscious level, if it fails to 
performs its normal functioning. Similarly, we are not emotionally excited when correctly 
perceiving an everyday object, such as a chair. However, if normal functioning of perception 
fails, if NfK is dissatisfied at this usually autonomous functioning level, we could feel such a 
condition highly emotionally, we are terrified. This is a staple of thrillers. Therefore, specific 
emotions related to NfK we identify as aesthetic emotions (Perlovsky, 2010a). They are 
subjectively perceived as harmony or disharmony between mental representations and 
surrounding world. These emotions are related to curiosity and to aesthetic emotions (Kant, 
1790). Kantian arguments have been reformulated in the contemporary language of psychology 
and knowledge-related emotions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of NfK have been connected to 
aesthetic emotions of the beautiful (Perlovsky, 2010a).  
The Grossberg-Levine theory of drives and emotions (1987) implies that the NfK drive 
includes mechanisms of sensor-like organs and neural circuitry, which measures the knowledge, 
the correspondence between mental representations and reality, and thus indicate to an organism 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the NfK. The candidate brain circuitry has been discussed in 
(Levine & Perlovsky 2008; Levine 2009). A satisfaction or dissatisfaction of NfK is perceived 
emotionally. Emotional pleasure is deeply rooted into physiology (Cabanac, 1971; Cabanac, 
Duclaux, & Spector, 1971; Cabanac & Duclaux, 1970) and has been proposed as the 
fundamental mechanism of decision-making (Cabanac, 1992; Cabanac & Bonniot-Cabanac, 
2007; Perlovsky, 2009). Mathematical models of NfK have predicted that a fundamental 
mechanism of perception and cognition includes an evolution of mental representations from 
vague to crisp (Perlovsky, 2001, 2006). This has been confirmed in brain imaging experiments 
(Bar et al, 2006; Perlovsky, 2009).   
The trade-off between maximizing knowledge and an opposite drive to minimize effort, 
including minimizing cognitive effort through heuristic thinking is discussed in (Levine & 
Perlovsky, 2008; Levine 2009). Both drives are hypothesized to be evolutionary adaptations. 
Candidate brain pathways involved in NfK were analyzed in (Levine 2009). Despite the 
significance of the topic, referenced evidence and theoretical discussions, experimental studies of 
knowledge-related emotions have been limited, limited evidence exists for a motivational status 
of curiosity as related to pure knowledge, without visceral effects and without bodily instincts.  
Here we address the curiosity for learning new knowledge, and ask, can the pleasure of 
this effort be demonstrated experimentally? This issue has not been previously studied and it has 
a principled significance for the NfK hypothesis: is NfK a primary drive caused and rewarded 
with pleasure? The present study explores the hypothesis that indeed satisfaction of curiosity and 
acquisition of knowledge is experienced emotionally as pleasure. Remaining difficulties are 
discussed near the end of the paper.  
 
 
 
Methods 
 
 
17 women ( 52.9 + 17.5 s.d. yr) and 15 men  ( 52.5 + 14.7s.d. yr) participated 
anonymously in the study. After an identification questionnaire: age, gender, level of education, 
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interest in politics, belonging to associations, and marital status, each participant was assigned 
first to Protocol 1 (P.1) to control for pleasure vs. reading and knowledge independent from 
curiosity, and second to Protocol 2 (P.2) to explore pleasure vs. curiosity. Protocol 1 controlled 
for pleasure of knowledge, independent from curiosity.  Half the group started with Protocol 1 
then Protocol 2, the other half of the group followed the reverse order (P2, then P1). In both 
protocols, the participant received a list of ten items (statements, questions, or pieces of 
information), one to explore pleasure vs. learning (P1), and the other to explore pleasure vs. 
curiosity (P2).  The participants were asked the following: 
 
Protocol 1 (P.1): 
- on the answering chart "P.1 knowledge" on ten indented lines the participant would 
indicate with a YES or a NO, with a pencil mark, whether he/she knew each of the 1-10 pieces of 
information provided on the knowledge list. The magnitude estimations of previous knowledge 
about items provided measured this way is abbreviated later as P1. prev.know. 
Examples of items from Protocol 1 (Pleasure vs. Knowledge) : 
Item 1: What is the meaning of the word « Huguenot »? 
Item 3: Do you know how to bake bread? 
Item 9: Do you know how Van Gogh died? 
   
 
 
the answering chart "P.1 Pleasure of learning" bore ten 140 mm-long horizontal lines; on these 
lines the participant would rate, with a pencil mark, the intensity of the pleasure/displeasure 
experienced when reading each piece of information provided on the knowledge list. In the 
middle of each line a zero indicated absence of any hedonicity (indifference); the right part of the 
line would indicate positive hedonicity (pleasure) and the left part negative hedonicity 
(displeasure):  
 
For each item: on the line below rate the pleasure/displeasure of learning it (after 
reading the answer) 
         
- --------------------------------0--------------------------------  +  
 
The magnitude estimations of pleasure of reading the answers provided measured this way is 
abbreviated later as P1. rtng.pleas.rd. 
 
Protocol 2 (P.2) consisted of a new list of ten questions, different from those in P.1, about 
various aspects of life or the environment. The participant would rate on two answering charts 
his/her curiosity to know the answer, and then the pleasure experienced when receiving the 
answer to the question: 
 
Examples of items from Protocol 2 (Pleasure vs. Curiosity)  
 
Do you wish to know the answers to the following 10 items? Answer y/n 
Item 1: Do you want to know the meaning of the word  « Anamorphosis »? 
Item 3: Do you want to know who said « The less one  thinks, the more one talks »? 
Item 9:Do you want to know the criteria used to rank  restaurants? 
   
  For each item: on the line below rate the pleasure/displeasure of learning it 
(after reading the answer) 
         
  -  --------------------------------0--------------------------------  + 
 
 
- the answering chart "P.2 Curiosity" bore ten 140 mm-long horizontal lines to rate, with 
a pencil mark, the intensity of experienced curiosity when reading the ten items that would be 
found on curiosity list.  In the middle of each line a zero indicated no curiosity; the right part of 
the line would indicate positive curiosity and the left part negative curiosity (rejection); the 
magnitude estimations of curiosity regarding the items provided measured this way is 
abbreviated later as P2. ratg.curios. 
- the answering chart "P.2 Pleasure of learning" bore ten 140 mm-long horizontal lines to 
rate, with a pencil mark, the intensity of the pleasure/displeasure experienced when reading each 
piece of information that answered each of the 1-10 questions raised on curiosity list.  In the 
middle of each line a zero indicated absence of any hedonicity (indifference); the right part of the 
line would indicate positive hedonicity (pleasure) and the left part negative hedonicity 
(displeasure). The magnitude estimations of pleasure of reading the answers provided measured 
this way is abbreviated later as P2. pleas.learn. 
  
 
 
Results 
 
 
A first-look at the results is contained in correlation matrixes shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
For this first-look overview of relationships among all variables, categorial variables (No, Yes) 
were substituted with (0, 1) correspondingly. In Table 1 correlations were computed within the 
entire data set (32 x 10 = 320) items for each entry in the table. In Table 2 correlations were 
computed for each subject separately (10 items) and then averaged over all subjects (32) (within-
participant computations); again total of 320 items contributed to computation of each entry in 
the table. Table 2 could give significantly different results from Table 1 for example, if 
contributions to correlations come from between subject variations, while within subject data 
were significantly different (say uncorrelated). This example illustrates that Table 1 gives 
relevant data for testing our hypothesis about correlation between curiosity and pleasure. In 
reality both tables show comparable correlation between curiosity and pleasure, lead to the same 
conclusion and this discussion becomes irrelevant. For completeness, Table 3 shows average and 
standard deviation values. 
If somewhat arbitrary, we choose significance level corresponding to p < 0.001 of 
accepting the null hypothesis if it is true (no correlation), a significance threshold in both cases is 
approximately 0.53. It is significant to note that only one correlation in each matrix is significant, 
that is the correlation between rating on curiosity and on pleasure of learning. This confirms the 
hypothesis that satisfaction of NfK has a significant hedonic component for subjects with higher 
rating on curiosity.  
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  Gender Age 
P1. 
prev.know 
P1. 
rtng.pleas.rd 
P2. 
ratg.curios 
P2. 
pleas.learn 
Gender 1 0.0146 0.0181 0.1472 0.1638 0.1567 
Age 0.0146 1 0.0532 -0.0929 -0.0905 -0.1443 
P1. prev.know 0.0181 0.0532 1 -0.1495 0.1527 0.1203 
P1. rtng.pleas.rd 0.1472 -0.0929 -0.1495 1 -0.0227 0.0071 
P2. ratg.curios 0.1638 -0.0905 0.1527 -0.0227 1 0.6099 
P2. pleas.learn 0.1567 -0.1443 0.1203 0.0071 0.6099 1 
 
Table 1. Correlation matrix computed within the entire data set. For this first-look overview of 
relationships among all variables, categorial variables (No, Yes) were substituted with (0, 1) 
correspondingly.  A significance threshold here is 0.53, corresponding to p > 0.999 rejection of the null 
hypothesis (no correlation). Only one correlation is significant, between rating on curiosity and pleasure 
of learning, confirming the hypothesis.   
 
  Gender Age 
P1. 
prev.know 
P1. 
rtng.pleas.rd 
P2. 
ratg.curios 
P2. 
pleas.learn 
Gender 1 0.0146 0.0181 0.1472 0.1638 0.1567 
Age 0.0146 1 0.0532 -0.0929 -0.0905 -0.1443 
P1. prev.know 0.0181 0.0532 1 -0.3033 0.1798 0.1219 
P1. rtng.pleas.rd 0.1472 -0.0929 -0.3033 1 -0.0913 -0.1122 
P2. ratg.curios 0.1638 -0.0905 0.1798 -0.0913 1 0.5927 
P2. pleas.learn 0.1567 -0.1443 0.1219 -0.1122 0.5927 1 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix using within-participant computations. 
 
  Gender Age 
P1. 
prev.know 
P1. 
rtng.pleas.rd 
P2. 
ratg.curios 
P2. 
pleas.learn 
average 1.53125 52.71875 0.5562 13.4094 13.1937 15.0781 
st.dev 0.507007349 16.47526861 0.5011 27.4532 35.9099 32.0781 
 
Table 3. Average and standard deviation values (for gender computation, we arbitrary assign 1 to males 
and 2 to females). 
 
 
The fact that ratings on pleasure of reading and pleasure of learning do not significantly 
correlate can be taken as a further indication of the validity of the results: ratings on curiosity 
were measured independently from ratings on pleasure from reading and knowledge, when 
curiosity was not involved (this was the purpose of the first protocol).  The correlation matrix in 
Table 1 gives a sufficient statistical characterization of the data for our purpose. The correlation 
coefficient of 0.61 between “curiosity” and “pleasure” is equivalent to 37% of variance of each 
of these variables being explained by the other one.  
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 
To understand significance and limitations of the present study, we briefly discuss cognitive 
theories of emotions additional to those mentioned in to first section. 
Curiosity is a complex ability, related to several functions of the mind. Wikipedia (2009) 
as well as most authors consider it an emotion. Its role in cognition is a subject of long debates. 
Frijda (1987) developed a theory of emotions in behaviorist tradition, considering emotions as 
epiphenomena, with the concept of "action tendency" as a focal issue. Emotions are, in this view, 
tendencies to engage in behavior. He discussed several basic emotions. (The Emotions 1986). 
Grossberg and Levitin (1987) proposed a cognitive theory of drives and emotions; in this theory 
emotions are neural signals communicating satisfaction or dissatisfaction of drives to decision-
making parts of the brain. Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1987) proposed a different cognitive theory 
of emotions. Emotions are cognitively based states. Complex emotions are derived from a small 
number of basic emotions and arise at junctures of social plans. Ortony, Clore, & Collins (1990) 
consider emotions developed as a consequence of certain cognitions and interpretations. These 
authors exclusively concentrate on the cognitive elicitors of emotions, and postulate that three 
aspects determine these cognitions: events, agents, and objects. Ortony & Turner (1990) 
questioned the view that there exist basic emotions out of which all other emotions are built, and 
in terms of which they can be explained; these authors suggested that the notion of basic 
emotions will not lead to significant progress in the field. They assumed that emotions are 
reduced to appraisals and other states that are not emotions. Cabanac (2002) considered emotions 
as common currency among motivational states necessary to make decisions in complex 
environments. Russell (2003) introduced a notion of core affect as an undifferentiated foundation 
of emotions. Juslin and Västfjäll (2008) discuss a number of neural mechanisms involved with 
emotions and different meanings implied for the word ‘emotion.’ Perlovsky (2001) introduced 
specific aesthetic emotions related to NfK in the spirit of (Grossberg and Levine 1987), and 
differentiated them from ‘lower’ emotions corresponding to bodily instincts. Schmidhuber 
(2009) suggested a theory of curiosity driven by a desire to find a maximally compressed 
representation of reality. In several respects this theory is similar to Perlovsky (2001) 
‘knowledge instinct’ or NfK. However, it does not describe recent neuroimaging data about 
perception mechanisms (Bar et al 2006); the idea of maximal compression, it seems, is narrower, 
and leads to limited aesthetic ideas vs. (Perlovsky 2010a,b). 
Up until this time most authors have discussed only few basic emotions, and the role of 
huge multiplicity of emotions, especially ‘musical’ emotions seems mysterious. Perlovsky 
(2010b) considered a process of differentiation of NfK and emergence of a multiplicity (an 
almost continuum) of ‘musical’ emotions. These are differentiated aesthetic emotions, 
cognitively necessary for reconciliation of cognitive dissonances between any pieces of 
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knowledge, which emerged with evolution of language. In some way musical emotions are 
differentiation of curiosity. 
We have not addressed above in sufficient details differences and similarities among 
NfK, need for cognition, and curiosity. NfK is very similar to need for cognition. First, NfK is a 
mental operation in the same way as cognition is. At intermediate hierarchical levels of the mind 
need for cognition may involve solving puzzles, or thinking through and enjoying intellectual 
challenges. These efforts lead to and to significant extent consist in improving mental 
representations (with regard to considered puzzles and challenges). So cognition leads to 
improved knowledge similar to NfK. (We would emphasize, although it is secondary to the 
content of this paper that, e.g. solving puzzles, does not consist exclusively in conscious steps 
but is a combination of conscious and unconscious mental activity, Perlovsky 2001, 2006). 
Cognition is usually attributed to hierarchical levels above perception. At these higher levels 
NfK and need for cognition are similar, and their satisfaction or dissatisfaction is experienced 
emotionally. At lower levels of perception NfK acts autonomously, related emotional neural 
signals are below the level of conscious registration, and comparison to need for cognition is not 
applicable. 
More problematic is comparison of NfK to curiosity. An excellent illustrative example is 
some people's curiosity to contents of tabloids. Does this kind of curiosity lead to improved 
cognitive representations? Are other drives than NfK fundamental to this kind of curiosity? 
These questions remain open for future studies. 
Relations of NfK and heuristics discussed by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) need 
additional clarifications. This requires analyzing cognitive mechanisms of language and 
cognition (Perlovsky 2009; Perlovsky & Ilin 2010). Language is learned by about 5 years of age, 
yet ability to understand and act like adults requires the lifetime. And even at the peak of mental 
powers few people attain crisp and clear understanding of the entire content of culture stored in 
language. The given references explain these facts as follows. Children can learn language 
representations early, without a need for life experience, because language representations exist 
in surrounding language ready-made. Learning cognitive representations requires life experience 
(and guidance from language representations). Because of this, not only children but also adults, 
when talking about areas where they lack direct experience, could rely on language and maintain 
intelligent conversation without real life understanding. Decision making that relies on cultural 
knowledge stored in language is called decision by heuristics. Heuristics store wealth of cultural 
knowledge and could be better than judgments from personal life experience. Nevertheless, 
heuristics repeat what has already been known, and do not lead to accumulation of new cultural 
knowledge. Language learning is driven by what Pinker (1994) called ‘the language instinct’; it 
is different from NfK or ‘the knowledge instinct’ as discussed above. Language instinct involves 
only language and does not involve life experience. Heuristics advantage of relying on culturally 
accepted and established ‘truths’ makes one more certain about his or her decisions. They 
prevent potentially risky ‘original thinking,’ but at the expense of refusing to acquire new 
knowledge. We note that in the 11th century Maimonides explained the Original Sin and 
expulsion from paradise due to Adam’s refusal to think originally. By eating from the ‘tree of 
knowledge’ Adam acquired the knowledge of heuristics (Levine & Perlovsky 2008). 
Bartoshuk, et al. (2005) recently warned that mistakes are made frequently when drawing 
conclusions from cross modality ratings of intensity as well as of hedonicity (Kubovy, 1999); 
this issue is avoided in the present study by computing two correlation matrices with essentially 
the same results. This method gives further strength to the conclusion that pleasure is closely 
correlated to curiosity, both as a motivation and as a reward. 
The present study thus confirms the evidence that pleasure/displeasure takes place as a 
common currency not only among biological and mental motivations (Cabanac, 1992), but, 
because mental pleasure has been hypothesized to be different from sensory pleasure (Kubovy, 
1999), as well in purely mental conflicts of motivations and in decision making (Ramírez, 
Bonniot-Cabanac, & Cabanac, 2005). Curiosity, may be added as a correlate with pleasure. Such 
a result would confirm that satisfying curiosity is rewarding (Eckblad, 1978). 
Curiosity seems to be a phylogenetically old motivation that proved selectively 
advantageous in evolution, animals may have some type of 'need' for sensory change (Hughes, 
1997). Epistemic curiosity activates reward circuitry and enhances memory (Kang, 2009).  The 
fact that improving knowledge is a zoologically ancient mechanism (Cabanac, Cabanac, & 
Parent, 2009), primarily based upon hedonicity and thus universal among humans, might be 
reflected in the absence of any significant correlation found here (Table I) between hedonicity 
and age or gender.  
With evolutionary emergence of representations in the brain, beginning possibly with 
Amniotes, mechanisms of perception (Cabanac, 1996) had to adapt mental representations to 
concrete conditions in the world.  It is hypothesized, at that level NfK emerged as a basic 
mechanism, fundamental for survival, acting autonomously, like digestion.  In evolution, with 
complex hierarchy of brain representations taking place in the human, from perception to 
abstract concepts, and higher up to ideas of the meaning and purpose of life, NfK has driven 
evolution of higher cognitive functions (Perlovsky, 2010a). 
Knowledge related emotions would potentially influence research in emotional 
intelligence (Mayer et al, 2001), emotional influence on learning (Levens & Phelps, 2008), 
cognition and consciousness (Phelps, 2005), self and personality (Luu, Collins, & Tucker, 2000) 
including personality types in relation to types of knowledge (Bartoshuk, 2010; Mauss & 
Robinson, 2009; Farb et al, 2010), as well as knowledge-related motivational dimensions of 
emotions (Harmon-Jones, 2004; Gable & Harmon- Jones, 2010; Perlovsky, 2010a). There are 
several directions to these future studies including neural mechanisms of the tradeoff between 
the NfK and cognitive effort minimization or need for closure (Levine & Perlovsky, 2008; 
Levine 2009), qualities of emotions related to NfK (Perlovsky, 2010b), and personality types 
with regard to each of these. 
We would emphasize that hedonic aspect of curiosity reported in the Results section is 
only one in a series of arguments establishing curiosity as a primary need. It should be taken 
together with theoretical arguments and experimental evidence discussed in the first and this last 
sections of the paper. Results reported here confirm a path discussed in (Levine & Perlovsky, 
2008; Levine 2009) to reconciliation between heuristic thinking (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) 
and knowledge maximizing thinking (Perlovsky 2001, 2006). Mathematical models of roles of 
emotions in language, higher cognitive abilities including aesthetic, musical, and sublime 
emotions (Perlovsky, 2006; 2007; 2009; 2010a; b) suggest that aesthetic emotions refer to 
knowledge-related experiences. Experimental demonstration of the details of involved 
mechanisms (Levine 2009), their conceptual and emotional aspects at higher cognitive levels, 
their differentiation, are directions for future research. By confirming that maximization of 
pleasure optimizes not only physiology but also mental experience, the reported results made a 
step in the direction demonstrating the fundamental aspect of the NfK hypothesis: NfK is a 
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primary drive, which satisfaction/dissatisfaction produces pleasure/displeasure. This contributed 
toward connecting several directions of theoretical explorations. 
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